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27 June

TO : Chief, Foreign Division "M"

DATE: 29 October 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Stay-Behind Operations

Return to:
E.C.C.

1. In our general planning for stay-behind operations, we have reached the point where it becomes extremely necessary for Washington and/or COS to do some specific planning on those targets which will have to be covered by stay-behind operations. At best we can devote 20 per cent of our intelligence effort to stay-behind operations at present, and we should try to arrive at the most profitable way to apply this 20 per cent in order to be able to build the skeleton which can be expanded if and when the time should come that our entire intelligence coverage would depend on such type of operations.

2. We will require the following:

a. A basic list of targets which we would be required to cover in a war-like situation or in a situation where the territory east of the Elbe or east of the Rhein is no longer physically accessible to us. The targets should be divided into:

- (1) Locations by areas or cities,
- (2) Specific types of targets such as rail lines, air fields, dumps, OB observations, etc.

b. That basic briefing material, if possible in German, be provided us at this time to train the stay-behind personnel in observations, report writing, and essential elements of information (I realize that a certain amount of this material has already been provided in the stay-behind memoranda which have reached us recently, but it is bulky, and it is not in German, and it would take an entire staff to break it down and to give it to specific agents).

3. The guidance requested in paragraph 2 will have to be specific, will have to limit itself to the essential elements of information, and will have to be drawn up on a strict listing of priorities since we must do the most important things now and cannot be asked to choose targets and locations from a basic paper containing dozens of each. You must, therefore, specifically tell us if you consider the Baltic ports more important than the rail crossing points across the Oder or that the rail center in Burg is more important than the one in Leipzig. I know that this request will necessitate very close liaison with the Armed Forces agencies, but it is they whom we will service at that time, and if we get their say now, they cannot complain about an inadequate coverage at a later date.

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4. We have sorted out our different efforts in the stay-behind field to date and have come to the point where we will do first things first, putting emphasis at this time on recruitment of head agents and W/T operators only, except for those operations which are centered in Berlin where our particular fortunate situation permits us to recruit letter boxes, cut-outs, hiding places, reception bases, couriers, etc., without bringing the component parts of any chain together at this time.

5. The stay-behind planning causes an immense problem in man-hours and in organization which, in my estimation, if it is to be done efficiently and adequately will require a separate section within this organization, the function of which would be nothing but stay-behind operations. They should recruit organizers and recruiters who will profit by current operations undertaken by us but who would have no stake in current information operations whatsoever and will methodically go down the list of priorities and the basic stay-behind setup as we have covered it in MGB-A-10409.

6. The weight of the stay-behind work in Berlin has been borne by [] who is fully briefed on the subject and especially on the many difficulties and near impossible situations. [] is returning to the U.S. on TDY in December of this year, and I suggest that he spend his TDY in Washington helping you set up a section devoted to stay-behind planning in Washington. This does not mean, however, that you should delay the forwarding of targets and EEI's to the field until [] has returned to Washington.

7. We are perhaps at present in a better position to screen the crop of refugees and to recruit the varied personnel necessary for a stay-behind program. What we still need are case officers whose sole function would be to devote themselves to that program and detailed specific briefing and briefing material (in German if possible) which can be used by such personnel.

8. Your early reaction to this memorandum would be appreciated.

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